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Abstract 
The executive remuneration policy of financial institutions has been 
indicated as one of the key factors that led to the recent financial crisis. As  
a consequence a number of legislative initiatives and best practices have been 
imposed,aimed at strengthening existing and creating new standards of good 
corporate governance at banks. The purpose of this article is to assess the 
effectiveness of Poland’s new regulations concerning banks' executive pay, 
which were introduced in the aftermath of the recent financial crisis. The 
research results indicate that the new legal rules have not been fully enforced. 
Public banks in Poland are not fulfilling the reporting obligations imposed by 
law and international principles. Given the crucial importance of executive 
remuneration policy in the financial sector to the stability of the banking sector, 
the inability to evaluate the progress made in the adjustment of executive 
remuneration practices to the new regulations may be perceived as one of the 
important risk factors that has not been effectively eliminated or even reduced in 
Poland yet. 
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1. Introduction  
The recent financial crisis, for which the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 
2008 is considered to be the symbolic beginning, showed the importance of 
executive remuneration policy in financial institutions. The inefficient system of 
executive pay was pointed out as one of the possible causes of the crisis. It was 
predominantly short-term oriented, which encouraged excessive risk-taking. As 
a result, many financial institutions were threatened by bankruptcy, and consequently, 
the stability of global financial systems was jeopardized. Hence, a number of 
legislative initiatives and best practices were introduced by international and 
national institutions responsible for the supervision of financial sectors. They aimed 
at improving existing and creating new corporate governance standards in the area 
of executive remuneration.  
The purpose of this paper is firstly to examine the evolution of regulation 
on executive remuneration in public banks operating in Poland. The actual 
binding law with regard to banker’s pay will be compared with international 
principles. Secondly, the paper focuses on disclosure of the level and the 
structure of bank's executive pay as well as the remuneration policy, in particular 
with regard to the use of long-term incentive programsbased on shares. We run 
the analysis using the sample of all the banks listed on the Warsaw Stock 
Exchange during 2008-2012. This was a period characterized by a high volatility 
of macroeconomic conditions and thestock market,as well as a numerous legal 
changes. It is therefore important to investigate the extent to which banks 
operating in such a turbulent economic and regulatory environment adapted their 
practices to the new recommended standards.  
2. International regulation for sound executive remuneration practices in 
the banking sector 
Executive remuneration policy is one of the most important instruments of 
corporate governance. It has attracted a lot of attention at the beginning of this 
century, when a number of corporate fraudsand accounting scandals related to 
the excessive pay in underperforming companies were revealed. As a response 
to the situation,legislative initiatives were introduced to compensate executives 
in a more effective manner. They focused on improving procedures of setting 
executive pay and disclosure of executive remuneration systems (Urbanek 2010, 
pp. 85-86). The most important goal was to link executive income with the 
corporate results. As a consequence, a significant part of the executive 
remuneration became variable components - bonuses and deferred share-based 
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compensation. An important role in the improved process of executive pay 
setting was played by board remuneration committees. 
Issues of executive remuneration policy were raised were for the first time 
in the OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, published in 1999 and 
updated in 2004. The international standards indicate the necessity of 
establishing board committees that should focus on key selected areas of board 
responsibilities, among others executive selection and designing their 
remuneration scheme. The committees should also have independent board 
members. OECD principles require public companies to disclose the level and 
the structure of executive and non-executive remuneration. The scope of 
thedisclosed information should be sufficient to assess how the executive 
remuneration may impact corporate performance, as well as to analyze costs and 
benefits from remuneration schemes and long-term incentive programs. Despite 
the fact that the OECD principles are quite general, they have become 
a benchmark for creating national versions of corporate governance codes, 
including with respect to executive remuneration. 
In 2004 the European Commission also issued recommendations for 
Member States on executive remuneration in public companies. They aimed at 
improving disclosure of remuneration. Public companies should disclose the 
executive remuneration scheme, including individual compensation amounts, in 
the form of a separate report attached to the annual financial statements, which 
should be available on the company's website. The report should present 
thecriteria for payout of compensation elements that are based on shares. 
Additionally, long-term incentive programs based on shares should be approved 
by the general meeting of shareholders. The next set of the European 
Commission recommendations,released in 2005, focused on a remuneration 
committee, which should consist of a majority of independent directors. The 
most important tasks of the committee encompass design of the executive 
remuneration scheme, monitoring the level and structure of executive 
remuneration, presenting opinions to the board on the choice between granting 
options to subscribe or to purchase shares. 
In April 2009 the European Commission issued recommendations on the 
remuneration of directors of listed companies that completed the EC 
Recommendations issued in 2004 and 2005.1 These recommendations seek to 
address the design of pay packages and remuneration policies in order to 
promote the growth of the company in the long run by maintaining a proper 
                                                 
1
 European Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the 
financial services sector (2009/384/EC) complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 
2005/162/EC as regards the regime for the remuneration of directors of listed companies.  
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balance between all remuneration components. Great attention is paid to the 
process of setting variable components of remuneration, severance payment and 
stock-based pay. In addition, a number of new mechanisms, such as cash 
incentive deferral, reduction of bonus in the case of subdued or negative 
corporate performance in the long-term (malus), or reclaiming bonuses paid 
based on results that later were proven to have been misstated, are introduced. 
Adoption of the clawback arrangements can be incorporated also in situationswhere 
there was a breach of the internal procedures of the company. Also, severance 
pay has been changed by the EC recommendations. Its level should be narrowed 
down and itshouldn’t be paid out if the relevant results are not delivered. The 
performance criteria which are a basis for remuneration payments should be 
aligned with long-term value creation and prudent risk-taking. 
Until 2009, there was no separate regulation on executive remuneration 
for financial institutions which took into account the specific nature of the 
corporate governance of banks. This specificity is made up of a number of 
factors: systemic risk, the scale and nature of banking operations, interdependencies 
between the entities of the financial sector, innovative financial instruments, the 
complex structure of ownership and control of large financial groups as well as 
thedynamic changes which take place in banks’ business models. An area that is 
closely linked with corporate governance is bank’s risk management. Failures 
and weaknesses of bank’s corporate governance can, to the large extent, be 
viewed as contributing to the recent financial crisis. The pre-crisis practice of 
executive remuneration in banks was not aligned with prudent risk-taking 
behaviour, as pay structures were too much focused on short-term gains, which 
led to excessive risk taking.  
Drawing lessons from the crisis, the European Commission in 2009 
formulatedRecommendation 384 - that executive remuneration policy should be 
tied to the level of bank’s risk appetite. Thispostulates that the current and future 
risk, cost of capital and liquidity ratios should be taken into account during the 
process of determining the criteria for measuring abank’s performance and the 
goals achieved by the individual members of the management board. The rules 
for setting the executive remuneration components policy also stress that 
executive pay should be linked to the bank’s performance, thatthe criteria used 
for measuring both abank’s performanceand the individual results should be the 
risk-adjusted, and thatthe eligibility criteria for share-based compensation should 
be clearly formulated. Most of the European countries did not follow the 
European Commission recommendations at a satisfactory level.2 As a result, the 
Commission decided to issue principles on remuneration in financial institutions 
                                                 
2
 European Commission, Green Paper. Corporate governance in financial institutions and 
remuneration policies, Brussels, 2010. 
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through a directive, including them in the revised Capital Requirements 
Directive (CRD III).3 The national banking supervisory authorities are obliged to 
oversee the remuneration policy and, if necessary, to enforce the Directive’s 
requirements through a system of sanctions. 
The provisions of CRD III coins a new term - Material-Risk-Takers 
(MTR) - which indicates a group of people whose professional actions can have 
a material effect on a bank’s risk exposure. The group encompasses " ... at least 
executive directors, individuals who make decisions regarding risk, staff 
engaged in control functions and any employee whose total remuneration, 
including discretionary pension benefit provisions, is at the level of executive 
directors and of individuals who make decisions regarding risk."4 For them, the 
ratio between cash payments and share-based remuneration must be adjusted to 
the level of risk taken. CRD III strictly defines,and sets minimumrequirements, 
onwhat part of variable remuneration should be deferred and for how long, as 
well as how much should be paid in shares or in their equivalent. Theproportion 
of deferred component is to be set at minimum of 40% over at minimum of three 
years, and for senior executive directors such as CEOs, at minimum of 60%. 
A minimum of 50% of the variable compensation shall be awarded in shares or 
in other non-cash instruments. Furthermore, financial institutions are required to 
establish a board remuneration committee. Last but not least, there is a great 
emphasis on the important role played by the disclosure of compensation 
practices. All the procedures related to setting the level and the structure, as well 
as the criteria, for executive remuneration payout should be disclosed . 
Table 1. Evolution of international principles concerning executive remuneration policy  
in public banks 
 2005a 2005b 2005c 2009d 2009e 2010f 
Transparency of executive 
remuneration policy - the scope of 
disclosure: 
- description of the main design 
characteristics 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
- description of long-term incentive 
programs paid in shares or share-
linked instruments. 
 +  
+ 
  
- individual disclosure  +     
                                                 
3
 Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Councilof 24 November 
2010amending Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the 
trading book and for re-securitisations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies. 
4
 Ibidem, point (3). 
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- Disclosure of all executive pay 
elements and the parameters for 
their payout  
 +  + +  
- severance payments   +  +   
- other non-cash remuneration 
components  
 +  +   
- annual reports on executive 
remuneration  
 +     
Mechanisms for Pay and 
Governance Structure: 
- Existence of a Remuneration 
Committee 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
- Composition of the Remuneration 
Committee and its tasks.  
+  + +   
- procedures for executive 
remuneration schemes 
   
+ + + 
- components of executive 
remuneration  
   
 + + 
- recommendation for using long-
term incentive programs paid in 
shares or share-linked instruments.  
   
 
 + 
- shareholders’ approval for long-
term incentives programs paid in 
shares or share-linked instruments 
 +  
 
  
a - OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 2004. 
b - European Commission Recommendation 2004/913/ECfostering an appropriate regime for the remuneration 
of directors of listed companies (Official Journal 385/55). 
c - European Commission Recommendation 2005/162/EC onthe role of non-executive or supervisory directors 
of listed companies and on thecommittees of the (supervisory) board,(Official Journal 52/51). 
d - European Commission Recommendationof 30 April 2009 complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC 
and 2005/162/EC as regards the regimefor the remuneration of directors of listed companies 2009/385/EC 
[Official Journal120/28]. 
e - European Commission Recommendation of 30 April 2009 on remuneration policies in the financial services 
sector (2009/384/EC) complementing Recommendations 2004/913/EC and 2005/162/EC as regards the regime 
for the remuneration of directors of listed companies. (Official Journal 120/22). 
f - Directive 2010/76/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 amending 
Directives 2006/48/EC and 2006/49/EC as regards capital requirements for the trading book and for  
resecuritizations, and the supervisory review of remuneration policies (Official Journal 329/3). 
Source: Own analysis based on the following documents. 
Table 1 summarizes the most important international standards regarding 
executive remuneration policy in financial institutions, and it demonstrates some 
trends.In the pre-crisis period legal initiatives on executive remuneration were 
directed to all companies, irrespective of their sector. The main emphasis was 
put primarily on disclosure of executive remuneration in accordance with the 
assumption that market allocation mechanisms, acting on the basis of price 
signals coming from the labour market for executives,play a major role in the 
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process of setting executive pay. In practice, this would mean that well-informed 
shareholders and capital markets are capable of puttingpressure on the boards 
and makingthem create effective systems of remuneration. During this period 
the establishmentof boards remuneration committees, composed mainly of 
independent board members,was highly recommended. Shareholders were 
advised to get involved to a greater extent in the process of creating the rules of 
executive remuneration policy through approval of their long-term incentive 
programs based on shares.  
However, the experience of the recent financial crisis experience has 
shown that it is necessary to mobilize - complementary to market mechanisms - 
methods of influence on the executive remuneration. The European Commission 
recommendation of 2009 put special emphasis on the procedure for setting 
executive remuneration, in particular on performance criteria, the structure of 
executive pay and rules of payout, as well as limitations on granting severance 
pay. Special regulations dedicated solely to financial sector institutions have emerged. 
3. Regulation of executive remuneration in public banks in Poland  
In Poland, the first regulation on executive remuneration was introduced 
to Accounting Act5 and Council of Ministers Directives,6 whichconcentrated 
solely on disclosure and were applicable to all public companies. Both required 
disclosure of the total remuneration of all executive directors and board members.  
The corporate governance code - so-called the Best Practices of Public 
Companies –was published in 2002 andbrought abouta significant breakthrough. 
Section 39 stated that “[t]he total remuneration of all executive directors should 
be disclosed in the annual report, broken down into all components of 
remuneration. If the remuneration of individual executive directors differs 
significantly, it is recommended to publish appropriate justification.”7 In 2005 
significant changes were introduced to the disclosure procedures with respect to 
executive remuneration. In the revised version Section 39 was replaced by the 
following:“[t]he total remuneration of all executive directors, as well as the 
                                                 
5
 The Accounting Act of 29 September 1994 (Official Journal No 121, item 591). 
6
 The Council of Ministers Ordinance dated October 16, 2001 regarding the type, form and 
scope of current and periodic information and dates of its passing by issuers of securities admitted 
to public trading (Official Journal No 139 item 1569); The Council of Ministers Ordinance dated 
August 11, 2004 on detailed requirements applicable to the issuance of prospectuses and 
abbreviated versions of such prospectuses (Journal of Laws No. 186, item 1921).  
7
 Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies as of 2002, Warsaw Stock Exchange, p. 10. 
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individual pay, together with a breakdown of its various components, should be 
disclosed in the annual report with information on the procedures and principles 
of its establishment.” The greatest novelty laidin the appointment of two 
supervisory board committees: the audit and remunerationcommittees –in Section 
28. Their tasks should be set forth in detail in the Supervisory Board Rules.The 
committees should submit annual reports on its activities to the supervisory 
board, which shouldalso be available to shareholders. 
In the next edition of the corporate governance code, as of 2005, the 
section on disclosure of executive remuneration was missing. It was removed 
and established as hard law, namely the Minister of Finance Directives on 
current and periodic information to be published by the issuers of securities.8 
According to this document the scope of mandatory disclosures include “... the 
value of salaries, bonuses and additional benefits, including those arising from 
long-term incentive programs usually equity-basedas well as programs based on 
senior bonds, convertible bonds, subscription warrants (in cash or non-cash), 
paid, accrued or potentially payable to each of the board members regardless of 
whether they were included in the company's costs or resulted from profit 
sharing. If the issuer is a parent company, jointly controlled entity or a significant 
investor - separate information on remuneration and rewards received with 
regards to all duties in the subsidiaries should be included; if the information is 
presented in the financial statements - the obligation shall be deemed satisfied by 
an indication of their inclusion in the financial statements". 
The next editions of the Polish corporate governance codes, as of 2010 
and 2012. refer directly to the European Commission Recommendationsof 2004 
and 2009. The stock exchange requires all public companies to follow the 
European Commission recommendation on executive remuneration, while it 
completely ignores the recommendation on executive remuneration in the 
financial institutions. The Financial Markets Supervisory Authority in Poland 
has been in charge of implementing the European standards on executive pay in 
the financial sector only since2011. Poland was one of the last Member States of 
the European Union to take legislative steps to adapt to the CRD III Directive.  
It did so by amending the Banking Act,9 the Act on Capital Market Supervision, 
and the Act on Trading in Financial Instruments .  
According to the new law, the Financial Supervisory Authority is in  
a position to determine the variable remuneration policy for executive board 
                                                 
8
 Decree of the Ministry of Finance dated 19 October 2005 on current and periodic information 
provided by issuers of securities (Official Journal from 2005, No 209, item 1744 § 95. 
9
 The Banking Law Act of 1997, as amended 28 April 2011 and the Act on trading in financial 
instruments and certain other laws (Official Journal from 2011 No 131, Item 763). 
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members at banks by issuing a resolution.10 As a result, an FSA resolution has 
become the most comprehensive Polish piece of law on variable remuneration 
policies in the banking sector. One of its chapters is devoted entirely to the issue 
of executive remuneration in banks. This new regulation will certainly bolster 
the authority of the remuneration committee. It should be established at a bank 
that fulfils at least one of the following conditions: is listed on the stock 
exchange; holds at least 1% of the assets of the banking sector; holds at least 1% 
of deposits of the banking sector; or holds at least 1% of the own funds of the 
banking sector. The regulator’s resolution does not delineate the tasks of the 
remuneration committee. It just mentions one - issuing an opinion on the policy 
applicable to the variable component of executive remuneration that should 
support the long-term growth of the bank’s and shareholders' value.  
The FSA resolution focuses on determining the variable remuneration 
components. The Supervisory Board is responsible for designing remuneration 
policy for the variable components, including unspecified pension benefit 
provisions, which must be preapproved by the remuneration committee. The 
policy should encompass all executive directors as well as individuals reporting 
directly to the management board members, regardless of the basis of their 
employment, branch directors and their deputies, chief accountants, those 
employees responsible for control/supervisory functions in the bank, and any 
individuals whose activities significantly impactthe bank's assets andliabilities.  
It is further provided, however, that the list should cover all people who have 
 a material impact on the bank's risk profile. 
The total executive remuneration should be set in such a way as to 
maintain a balance between fixed and variable remuneration, in order to enable 
decreasing or disallowing the variable components if the goals are not met. 
Whensetting the variable remuneration, not only shouldthe individual results be 
measured and assessed, but also the results of the entire bank should be taken 
into account. Each component should be linked to the bank's performance, 
however the performance measures shall be risk-adjusted, imposed by the bank's 
activities as well as the bank growth cycle. It provides that the individual 
evaluation should take place at least after 3 years, or when the risk materializes.  
In order to encourage bank executives to take into account the long-term 
growth of the company, at least 50% of variable remuneration must be based on 
shares or corresponding non-cash instruments that reflect the quality of credit 
                                                 
10
 Resolution no. 258/2011of the Polish Financial Supervision Authorityof 04 October 2011on 
Detailed Principles of Functioning of the Risk Management System and Internal ControlSystem 
and Detailed Conditions of Internal Capital Assessment by Banks and of Reviewingthe Process of 
Internal Capital Assessment and Maintenance and the Principles ofDetermining the Policy on 
Variable Components of Remuneration of Persons HoldingManagerial Positions at a Bank. 
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institutions. In addition, banks should have a share retention policy in place, and 
40% of variable pay -and in the case of particularly large amounts up to 60% -is 
subject to a mandatory deferral for a period of three to five years. The payout, in 
equal annual instalments payable in arrear, is subject to the individual performance 
and its evaluation, whichtakes into account the goals set for the individual and 
the bank as a whole, as well as the bank's risk level, business cycle, the nature of 
the business, its risks and scope of responsibilities of the evaluated executive 
director.  
When the contract with an executive director is terminated, his(or her) 
severance payment should depend on his productivity and the quality of his 
work, so as not to reward poor performance. His retirement benefits should be 
based on bank shares. The FSAresolution stipulates, however, that the benefits 
are payable only after five years from the date of termination. In the case of an 
executive director who has reached retirement age, the bank pays their pension 
benefits in the form of shares or their equivalent, provided that the employee 
sells them after a period of five years from the termination of the contract. 
Table 2. Evolution of the regulation of executive remuneration policy in public banks in Poland 
Code of Best Practice for 
Warsaw Stock Exchange 
(WSE) Listed Companies 
2002 2005 2007 
 
2010 
 
2012 
Legal rules 
 2005a  2009 b  2011c 33 
Transparency of executive 
remuneration policy - the 
scope of disclosure: 
- description of the main 
design characteristics 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
 
 
+ 
- description of long-term 
incentive programs paid in 
shares or share-linked 
instruments.  
   
 + 
 
+ 
- individual disclosure + +  +    
- Disclosure of all executive 
pay elements and the 
parameters for their payout  
 +  + +  + 
- severance payments  
 +  + +  + 
- other non-cash remuneration 
components   +  + +  + 
- annual reports on executive 
remuneration     
  
 
 
Mechanisms for Pay and 
Governance Structure: 
- Existence of a 
RemunerationCommittee 
 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
 
+ 
 
+ 
 
+ 
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- Composition of 
Remuneration Committee 
and its tasks.  
 + +  + + + 
- procedures for executive 
remuneration schemes     + + + 
- components of executive 
remuneration      + + + 
- recommendation to use long-
term incentive programs paid 
in shares or share-linked 
instruments.  
     +  
- shareholders’ approval for 
long-term incentive 
programs paid in shares or 
share-linked instruments 
    +  + 
a - Decree of the Ministry of Finance dated 19 October 2005 on current and periodic information provided by 
issuers of securities,11 
b - Regulation of the Minister of Finance dated February 19, 2009 on current and interim information delivered 
by issuers of securities and conditions for recognizing as equivalent the information required by the laws of  
a non-member state,12 
c - The Banking Law Act of 1997,as amended 28 April 2011; Resolution no. 258/2011of the Polish Financial 
Supervision Authority of 04 October 2011 on Detailed Principles of Functioning of the Risk Management 
System and Internal Control System and Detailed Conditions of Internal Capital Assessment by Banks and of 
Reviewing the Process of Internal Capital Assessment and Maintenance and the Principles of Determining the 
Policy on Variable Components of Remuneration of Persons Holding Managerial Positions at a Bank.  
Source: Own analysis based on the following documents. 
Analysis of the evolution of the regulations related to bank executive 
remuneration indicates the presence of several regularities (Urbanek, Wieczorek 
2012). First, most of the rules on executive remuneration were contained in the 
corporate governance code, although in a generic manner, prior to theirintroduction 
into the law (Table 2). This sequence derives from the fact that the corporate 
governance code is much more flexible and its implementation does not require 
passing throughan arduous parliamentary legislative procedure. It also makes it 
possibleto reach high corporate governance standards by trial and error. Hence 
those rules that well fit the country's institutional context are moved into the 
hard law. Secondly, there is a gap between the time when international standards 
are introduced and the period of implementation to either Polish regulations or 
the corporate governance code. The delay in implementation of the European 
Commission recommendations of 2004 amounted to almost three years. Thirdly, 
                                                 
11
 Decree of the Ministry of Finance dated 19 October 2005 on current and periodic 
information provided by issuers of securities (Official Journal from 2005, No 209, item 1744 § 95). 
12
 Regulation of the Minister of Finance dated 19 February 2009 on current and interim 
information delivered by issuers of securities and conditions for recognising as equivalent the 
information required by the laws of a non-member state (Journal of Laws No. 33 item 259 § 91). 
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the analysis of different versions of Polish corporate governance codes reflects 
anevolutionary approach to the issues surrounding executive remuneration. Until 
the recent financial crisis , the Warsaw Stock Exchange Councilrecommended to 
public companies a relatively narrow range of disclosures, and no procedures 
with respect to setting executive remuneration. The real breakthrough appeared 
in 2010, when the newest version of the Polish corporate governance code made 
reference to the European Commission recommendations of 2004 and 2005. 
Also, it took two years to implement the international standards on executive 
remuneration in financial institutions, which was enforced by the adoption of the 
CRD III Directive. 
Executive remuneration inpublic banks in Poland - results of empirical research  
The analysis of executive remuneration policy was conducted on a sample 
of all 16 banks listed on the Warsaw Stock Exchange. It is based on unique 
hand-collected data from annual reports of public banks for the period 2008-
2012. The timeframe for which data was collected enables the examination of 
executive remuneration policy during the economic downturn and upturn. The 
first two years of the study mark a period of decline in the capital market, while 
the next three years were characterized by a gradual catching up on losses 
previously incurred. In latter period there were also significant changes in the 
regulatory environment of public banks, including extended regulation of 
executive remuneration. Thus, it seems worthwhile to assess the extent to which 
banks operating in such a turbulent economic and regulatory environment adopt 
their practices on executive remuneration. 
We commence the analysis of bank's executive remuneration in Poland by 
scrutinising one of its important features - transparency. This is considered to be 
one of the most important attributes of good corporate governance. High 
transparency in any aspect of corporate governance bolsters confidence in the 
capital market and creates an atmosphere of openness. Shareholders and other 
stakeholder groups have a right to full information about the bank, including 
information on executive remuneration policy. This disclosure is one of the most 
important prerequisites for the curbing opportunistic behaviour on the part of 
managers. An objective evaluation of the quality of the service provided by 
executive directors requires access to information on the level and structure of 
other executives pay as well. Disclosure is enforced by sanctions such as 
reputation and social control based on the rule ‘name it and shame it’ (Słomka – 
Gołębiowska 2012). 
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Taking into account the evolution of the regulatory framework for 
executive remuneration, in particular its transparency, as well as the significant 
changes introduced to the corporate governance code since 2010, one could 
expect a real quantitative and qualitative leap in terms of the scope of the 
disclosures. In accordance with rule I.1. of the Polish corporate governance code,  
a company should follow the European Commission recommendation no. 913  
of 2004, which imposes an obligation to disclose, inter alia, remuneration paid 
in the form of profit sharing or bonus, severance payments, an estimated value 
of non-cash benefits, as well as an accurate description of the share-based 
incentive programs. However, Table 3 shows onlyvery minor improvements in the 
disclosure of executive remuneration in public banks in Poland during the period 
2008-2012. Most of them did not change their disclosure practices on executive 
remuneration. Only three banks increased the number of disclosed components of 
the remuneration package, while a few banks actually limited the scope of the 
disclosure. Last but not least, four banks consistently did not break the total CEO 
remuneration into any components at all for the entire period of the study.13 
None of the banks described the remuneration policy in any section of the 
annual financial statement, despite the fact that such an obligation arises not 
only from the international principles but also from the Polishbanking law.14 
Both the European Commission as well as international organizations such as 
the FSB stress the importance of transparency of executive remuneration policy. 
Financial institutions should show the remuneration policy objectives, criteria 
and time horizon of the assessment, the method of applying risk adjustment to 
bank's performance measures, linkages between variable executive pay and a 
bank’s overall financial performance, thestructure of remuneration packages, 
incentive programs based on shares or similar instruments, as well as rules of 
severance payment. The lack of such information results in the anomaly that we 
know how much banks' executive directors earn, but we do not know why. The 
answer to the lastquestion is crucial for assessing the merits of executive 
remuneration policy in banks. 
                                                 
13
 An example of bypassing disclosure obligations arising from the regulations is offered by 
the practice of PKO BP SA, which in its annual reports presents only the total remuneration of the 
CEO. Att the same time one can read in the report that the bank complies with Code of Best 
Practice for WSE Listed Companies: “... PKO Polish Bank SA adopted in 2011 the necessary measures 
to ensure full compliance with Code of Best Practice for WSE Listed Companies. In the opinion of the 
Board, in 2011 PKO Polish Bank SA does not depart from the rules contained in the Code ... ” 
14
 The Banking Law Act of 1997 as amended 28 April 2011 (Journal of Law from 2011 No 
131, item 763); Point 111a Section 1: “1.The Bank shall, subject to paragraph. 2, announce to the public 
and generally make available: ... 2) The rules for determining the executive remuneration in the bank.” 
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In assessing the standards of transparency of executive remuneration 
policy in the public banks operating in Poland, two important issues can be 
raised. First, banks, as institutions of public trust, should be role models for non-
financial listed companies in implementing good standards of corporate 
governance. So far, they have not fulfilled the reporting obligations on disclosure of 
executive remuneration imposed by law. Secondly, given that the flawed executive 
remuneration policy in financial institutions is perceived as a cause of the recent 
financial crisis, the lack of ability to assess the executive remuneration practices 
can be seen as one of the important risk factors forfinancial stability, and onethat 
Poland has not been effectively eliminated or reduced. 
Table 3. Disclosure of the structure of executive remuneration in public banks in Poland – number 
of disclosed components of the total executive pay 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BOŚ 1 1 1 1 1 
BPH 5 3 4 4 4 
BGŻ 0 0 3 3 3 
BRE 3 3 4 4 5 
BZ WBK 2 2 2 2 2 
Alior Bank - - - - 2 
Paribas Fortis 3 3 3 3 N.A. 
Kredyt Bank 4 4 4 4 4 
DZ Polska 1 1 1 - - 
Bank Handlowy 3 3 3 3 3 
ING 2 3 3 3 3 
Millennium 2 2 2 2 2 
Noble Bank 1 2 2 2 2 
Nordea 1 1 1 1 1 
Pekao S. A. 3 3 3 3 3 
PKO BP 1 1 1 1 1 
Source: Own analysis based on banks' financial statements.  
Our analysis also covers the procedures for determining the remuneration 
policy. The empirical research results demonstrate that excessive and imprudent 
risk was one of the main reasons that led to financial problems and 
thebankruptcy of many financial institutions. The evidence is convincing that 
poorly designed compensation arrangements encouraged excessive risk taking. 
Hence, the post-crisis recommendations have imposed new rules for the 
calculation and payment of variable executive remuneration components, 
including both bonuses as well as the long-term incentiveprograms based on 
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shares. Annual bonuses should be dependent on the bank's performance. This 
increases the degree of aggressiveness of executive remuneration policy and 
introduces an element of risk for executive directors. This should ensure 
executives' dynamism in running a bank and put pressure on them toimprovethe 
bank's performance. 
Due to the lack of transparency of banks' remuneration policy (Table 4), it 
is very difficult to assess whether the banks in our sample used aggressive 
executive remuneration mechanisms. During the period 2008-2012 only five 
banks revealed information about the amount of bonuses granted to theirCEOs. 
Furthermore, it is highly exceptional to see additional explanations of the period 
for which a bonus is granted and is paid out. None of the banks disclose the 
performance criteria on which any entitlement to the variable components of 
executive remuneration is based. Such practices stand in sharp contrast to the 
European Commission recommendation no. 913 of 2004, as well as the FSA 
Resolution according to which "... variable remuneration should be accounted 
for and paid in a transparent manner to ensure effective implementation of the 
policy variable components of executive remuneration".15 
Table 4 demonstrates that public banks in Poland pursued conservative as 
opposed to aggressive executive remuneration policy (Słomka-Gołębiowska 
2013, pp. 135-154). The banks' supervisory boards are reluctant to motivate 
executive directors via granting significant variable remuneration. Only two 
banks - BPH and Paribas Fortis - rewarded their CEOs with a significant portion 
of total remuneration in the form of bonusesin each of the studied years. 
Definitely there are more cases where bonuses were not paid at all or their 
sharein the total pay was negligible. This may reflect the bank's interpretation of 
the FSAResolution suggesting that the fixed component should account for  
a large enough proportion of the total remuneration. This allows for the 
flexibility of policy variable remuneration, including the lowering bonusesor not 
paying any out at all.  
The analysis does not indicate any significant changes in executive 
remuneration policy at the public banks in Poland following the recent crisis. 
There is no increase of the variable remuneration component since 2010, when 
the bank's corporate results have notably improved. It is also not possible to 
assess how banks comply with the FSA recommendations requiring the deferment 
of bonus payments and payments in shares or share-linked instruments.  
 
 
                                                 
15
 Resolution no. 258/2011of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority of 04 October 2011, § 29.12. 
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Table 4. The ratio of bonuses in total CEO remuneration in public banks in Poland 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BOŚ N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
BPH 44,2% 28,9% 39,3% 35,8% 40,5% 
BGŻ N.A. N.A. 14,5% 26,4% 14,5% 
BRE 0,0% 54,1% 3,5% 13,5% 43,4% 
BZ WBK N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Alior Bank - - - - 0,0% 
Paribas Fortis 44,1% 28,6% 32,1% 31,0% N.A. 
Kredyt Bank 7,0% 14,8% 0,0% 8,7% 39,1% 
DZ Polska N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Bank Handlowy N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
ING N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Millennium N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Noble Bank N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Nordea N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Pekao S. A. 34,6% 13,4% 17,2% 20,5% 15,3% 
PKO BP N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Source: Own analysis based on banks' financial statements.  
Both the international principles and national regulations on executive 
remuneration strongly emphasize the use of long-term incentive programs that 
are based on sharesfor financial institutions. Assessment of the use of long-term 
incentives by public banks in Poland encounters similar difficulties as the 
evaluation of payment of bonuses. The supervisory authority has imposed no 
uniform standards of disclosed information on long-term share-based 
remuneration. Hence, it is almost impossible to compare different long-term 
incentive programs in public banks in Poland.  
Table 5 shows that ten banks out of 16 had some kind of long-term 
incentive program involving payment in share-linked instruments. However, 
only three banks designed them based on its own equity of the issuer. Two other 
banks offered their executives additional participation in the motivation program 
that is run within the capital group. Five banks exclusively used long-term 
incentiveprograms based on shares of the parent bank. This latter case is 
inconsistent with the main objective of such schemes, which aim at enhancing 
bank’s long-term value creation for shareholders and other stakeholders. Such 
programs serve to motivate executives' efforts. In addition, the interpretation of 
the FSAResolution16 is clear. It stresses that the payment of share-based 
remuneration should not be made in shares of the parent company. Moreover,  
                                                 
16
 Resolution no. 258/2011of the Polish Financial Supervision Authority of 04 October 2011. 
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a substantial proportion (e.g. more than fifty percent) of variable remuneration 
should be awarded in shares or share-linked instruments in order to create 
incentives aligned with the creation of long-term value for a bank. 
The importance of the long-term incentive programs can be measured by 
the ratio of share-based compensation to the executive remuneration. Table 5 
shows that only Noble Bank and Alior Bank resembled banks from the European 
Union, as their proportion of shares in total pay is higher than 30%. In other 
public banks in Poland the income from shares and share options did not exceed 
10% of the total executive remuneration. Also, there were no significant 
differences in theuse of share-based programs by banks during the recent crisis 
2008-2009 and in the post-crisis period. The low transparency in the reporting 
makes it difficult to assess whether banks are complyingwith the FSA resolution.  
Table 5. The ratio of the value of long-term incentive programs based on shares or similar 
instruments to total executive remuneration 
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
BOŚ 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
BPH* 15,4% 7,1% 8,6% 6,9% 6,2% 
BGŻ 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
BRE*** 0,0% 0,0% 7,2% 7,7% 4,5% 
BZ WBK** N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Alior Bank** N.A. N.A. N.A. 19,8% 87,47% 
Paribas Fortis* 1,2% 1,3% 1,1% 1,3% 6,6% 
Kredyt Bank 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
DZ Polska 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Bank Handlowy* 5,5% 2,4% 4,1% 11,9% 7,7% 
ING* 0,0% 0,1% 0,5% 0,7% 1,9% 
Millennium 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
Noble Bank** 0,0% 0,0% 35,8% 46,2% 13,4% 
Nordea* 6,3% 6,0% 10,1% 3,9% N.A. 
Pekao S. A.*** 2,9% 3,5% 17,0% 16,0% 6,8% 
PKO BP 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 0,0% 
* programs based on shares of the parent bank 
** programs based on the equity of the issuer 
*** programs based on shares of the parent bank and ** programs based on the equity of the issuer  
Source: P. Urbanek, Programy partycypacji we własności jako narzędzie polityki wynagradzania 
kadry kierowniczej na przykładzie banków publicznych w Polsce (Participation programs 
in equity as a remuneration policy instrument for supervisory directors: the case of 
Poland), "Law and Economics" conference proceedings, Toruń 2013. 
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4. Conclusions 
The recent financial crisis revealed the consequences of inefficient 
executive remuneration practices in financial institutions. Executive remuneration 
policy which encourages excessive risk-taking in the banking sector may 
threaten the viability of a bank and the stability of the financial system. In 
reaction to the financial crisis certain actions were undertaken, among them 
amendments to the supervisory framework for the financial sector. A number of 
legislative initiatives were adopted by international organizations and national 
regulators which aimed at strengthening existing and creating new standards of 
executive remuneration policy.  
The above analysis shows that the specific regulatory gap that existed 
between the regulations binding in Poland and those legal rules applicable to 
foreign financial institutions was removed in 2011 due to implementation of the 
CRD III Directive. However, the research results indicate that the new legal 
rules have not been completely enforced. Public banks in Poland arenot fulfilling 
the reporting obligations imposed by law and international principles. Hence, it 
is hardly possible to assess whether they comply with the FSArecommendations 
on the structure of the variable component of bank's executive pay. Given the 
crucial importance of executive remuneration policy in the financial sector to the 
stability of banking sector,the inability to evaluate the progress in adjusting 
executive remuneration practices to the new regulations may be perceived as one 
of the important risk factors that has not been effectively eliminated or even 
reduced in Poland yet. 
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Streszczenie  
 
POLITYKA WYNAGRADZANIA KADRY ZARZĄDZAJĄCEJ W SEKTORZE 
BANKOWYM W POLSCE PO KRYZYSIE FINANSOWYM – EWOLUCJA 
CZY REWOLUCJA? 
 
Polityka wynagradzania osób zarządzających instytucjami finansowymi została 
zidentyfikowana, jako jeden z kluczowych czynników, który doprowadził do ostatniego 
kryzysu finansowego. Reakcją na dysfunkcjonalności tej polityki są liczne inicjatywy 
legislacyjne i środowiskowe mające na celu wzmacnianie istniejących i tworzenie 
nowych standardów regulujących ten obszar nadzoru korporacyjnego. Celem artykułu 
jest ocena skuteczności nowych regulacji obowiązujących banki publiczne w Polsce 
wprowadzonych po ostatniego wybuchu kryzysu finansowego. Stosowane przez banki 
praktyki zostaną skonfrontowane ze standardami prawnymi i środowiskowymi.  
 
Słowa kluczowe: ład korporacyjny, polityka wynagradzania, banki, kryzys finansowy
